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Abstract 
The Southwest effect has been known for some time in terms of the US airline’s 
impact on pricing, competition and traffic volumes. But recent estimates of the impact 
on traffic and market shares do not exist. This desideratum can be addressed by 
applying Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models with 
Intervention analysis to key domestic air routes in the USA where Southwest has 
started service. 
 
The paper first deals with the choice of routes to be examined and, after a preliminary 
statistical description of these, applies the ARIMA models. These results are 
examined for both their statistical qualities and their reasonableness and the impacts 
are compared to those previously determined in the same way for Ryanair’s routes 
from London. 
 
Keywords: Low-Cost Carriers, ARIMA Models, Intervention Analysis, Market 
Share. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Previous published work (Pitfield, 2007a) has been able to demonstrate, using 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) modelling with Intervention 
Analysis, what the impact of Ryanair’s start up of service from London Stansted 
(STN) has been on competing airlines flying from other airports in the London system 
to either the same airport as Ryanair but more usually to an airport that is not thought 
of as a secondary airport. The impact is considerable. Passenger numbers grow on the 
route as a result of the start up and Ryanair at least captures that growth and normally 
has an impact on existing carriers by taking some of their share of the market as well. 
 
Ryanair based its business model on one first developed by Southwest, originally 
based in Texas but now the sixth biggest airline in the USA (Calder, 2002) and the 
only US airline to have been profitable every year since its inception. The impact of 
Southwest on prices (Morrison, 2001) and its competitors is so well known it has long 
been referred to as ‘the Southwest Effect’ (USDOT, 1993; Richards, 1996) with 
evidence being seen at Baltimore-Washington International (BWI) Airport (Phillips, 
1996) and again at Denver (DEN).1 Boguslaski, Ito and Lee, (2004) investigate the 
entry patterns of Southwest and indicate airlines that might be vulnerable to such 
competition and McMullen and Du (2007) have investigated the impact of the ATA – 
Southwest code share. 
 
However, there have not been any recent estimates on the impact on traffic. Estimates 
exist in the past papers of Windle et al (1995), Dresner et al (1996) and Vowles 
(2001). The first mentioned paper looked at data from 1991 to 1994 and found that the 
                                                 
1 Airport Business (2006) 
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entry of Southwest onto a route resulted in an average price decline of 48 percent and 
a traffic increase of 200 percent on the Southwest routes whereas the second paper, 
which in part focuses on Southwest’s start up at BWI in 1993, develops a general 
econometric model so as to comment principally on pricing behaviour. The third 
paper undertakes a series of airport case studies including one for BWI.  
 
A current estimate of the intervention effect on passenger numbers of Southwest, its 
competitors or on total traffic on the routes will enable comparisons with past 
estimates and with the Ryanair impact previously determined. In addition, it will 
allow impacts to be determined for a much more mature market situation when the 
most recent start ups are examined.   
 
USBTS Form 100 data is available online on a monthly basis from 1990 (BTS, 2006). 
This details origin-destination passengers carried between airports by airline and 
ARIMA models can be applied to this data before the start up of Southwest on routes 
when its impact can be estimated. 
 
2.0 Data 
The difficulty with this proposed approach, given the longevity of Southwest and its 
presence on many routes before 1990, is that the routes that can be examined are 
limited. Clearly, the start of Southwest service has to be after 1990 so that a time 
series model can be built before it intervenes. In addition, there is some credibility in 
the notion that ‘important’ routes should be looked at. In terms of passenger volume 
this can be based on the size of airports and Table 1 lists the ten busiest US airports. 
But this does not help much in terms of determining which city pair flows are 
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‘important’ or which could demonstrate the size of impact of Southwest on principal 
domestic traffic flows. An approach is taken here which first examines FAA data to 
identify city pairs in the 48 contiguous states that have a large number of flights 
between them as a guide to which city pairs should be examined in the BTS data to 
determine total passenger flows on corridors (see Table 2). This analysis is 
undertaken for 2005 and then candidate routes are examined. Some of these 
candidates represent flows between hub airports, for example Atlanta, Hartsfield 
(ATL) - Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) and Chicago O’Hare (ORD) – Minneapolis St. 
Paul (MSP) and some represent flows between hubs and non-hubs, for example, ORD 
– Washington Reagan (DCA)2. 
 
A further aspect that should be covered is airport usage. Southwest often uses 
secondary airports, for example Chicago Midway (MDW) instead of ORD and BWI 
instead, at the time of the commencement of service, of the other Washington 
Airports, Reagan (DCA) and Dulles (IAD)3. There is an opportunity here to 
investigate its impact on major carriers flying the same corridor, but not using the 
secondary airports. Traffic on this Washington-Chicago corridor provides an 
opportunity to study this impact as Southwest started at BWI in September 1993 and 
was in competition with United and American as well as at various times American 
Eagle, US Airways and Northwest4. 
 
                                                 
2 Airline Hubs are listed by Oster Jr. and Strong (2006) but these are not in accordance with the FAA’s 
definition of hubs and non-hubs which is based on the number of enplanements. 
3 By late 2006 Southwest was flying to MDW from IAD and ATA was code sharing with Southwest 
from DCA to MDW. Airline Weekly (2006) refers to ‘ Battling for the Capital’. DCA is capacity 
constrained and only handles domestic and Canadian trans-border flights of less than 1,250 miles. 
4 It might be hard to think of MDW as secondary as it is 10 miles from downtown Chicago whilst ORD 
is some 17 miles distant. Similarly, although BWI is 11 miles from downtown Baltimore it is only 33 
miles from Washington DC whereas IAD is 25 miles distant with DCA closer at 5 miles. 
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Another route that can be examined is Philadelphia (PHL) to ORD as Southwest 
commenced service here in May 2004 and uses only one secondary airport (MDW not 
ORD) compared to the main competition from United, American and US Airways. 
Traffic from PHL to both ORD and MDW can be examined. 
 
Further, the route between MDW and Providence, Rhode Island (PVD) has been 
operated by Southwest since October 1996. In addition, service has been offered from 
Manchester – Boston Regional Airport, New Hampshire (MHT) from June 1998. 
Both of these New England cities are promoted as Boston airports with one being 
recently renamed and both being about 50 miles from Boston. Of course Boston, 
Logan (BOS) is served by the major carriers who for much of the period were United 
and American. Although Chicago-Boston does not feature as a major city pairing 
from Table 2, it is clear that the inclusion of Providence and Manchester traffic brings 
it up to nearly 3 million in 2005 with some 170 flights scheduled in the summer 
period and so it is very  worthy of study on any grounds of importance. Southwest is 
again using secondary airports at both ends of the route and there is the issue of their 
code share with ATA Airlines to explore. 
 
Another route from Chicago Midway (MDW), where Southwest operates a number of 
services, is to Oakland, California (OAK). This is a secondary airport for San 
Francisco as the two cities are 13 miles apart on opposite sides of San Francisco Bay. 
This service officially started in April 2002. However, the BTS data records 
Southwest flights to OAK in most months and in most years since 1990 when the 
earliest available data is available online. Not only that, but there are also regular 
flights to San Francisco (SFO) recorded in the BTS data. Nevertheless, the volume of 
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Southwest traffic shows a sharp increase on the official commencement of service so 
the impact of this official start up on the Chicago (ORD and MDW) - Bay Area (SFO 
and OAK) can be examined. The main competitors are American on SFO-ORD, 
United on OAK-ORD and SFO-ORD along with ATA on SFO-MDW5. The overall 
route in 2005 carried just over 2.5 million passengers. 
 
Finally, although the start up is very recent (January 2006), Denver (DEN) to Las 
Vegas (LAS) represents an opportunity to examine the impact when Southwest uses 
the same airports as its competitors. Competition here is with United, American West 
and Frontier Airlines, another low-cost airline. The previous work by Pitfield (2007a) 
would suggest that this impact would be greater than the case of one airport being 
shared with the competition and that this would be greater again than the case where 
Southwest uses two secondary airports. However, competition from another low-cost 
carrier, Frontier, may dilute this impact. 
 
The other candidate routes in Table 2 either show that Southwest commenced service 
before 19906 or that it does not serve these airports as of mid-2006. 
 
3.0 ARIMA Modelling 
The formal method of ARIMA modelling and Intervention Analysis can be found in a 
variety of textbooks including Wei (1994) and McDowell et al (1980) and the 
published appendix to Pitfield (2007a) contains both an outline of this and of the 
assessment of goodness-of-fit. 
 
                                                 
5 The impact of the ATA Southwest code share can again be investigated 
6 Otherwise it would be especially interesting to examine the impact on the traffic between the Bay 
Area (San Francisco, SFO and Oakland, OAK) to LAX first noted by USDOT (1993). 
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The purpose of ARIMA models is to duplicate as closely as possible the typical 
variations in a time series. Their adequacy is checked by examining both goodness-of-
fit statistics and whether the residuals are white noise. If they are adequate, then the 
model will have captured all the indigenous factors that underlie the variation in the 
series being modelled. If such a model is calibrated on the traffic data before the 
commencement of Southwest service, then the same model form, plus an intervention 
variable, can be applied to the whole data series to establish the impact on the total 
series of the start up. This can then be compared to the size of actual market shares 
and inferences drawn on the impact of competition. 
 
As the data series are monthly observations from 1990, it is clear that there will be 
both seasonal and non-seasonal components in the model. In essence, the series is 
forced to have a constant variance initially by taking a logarithmic transformation if 
required. Autocorrelation Function plots (ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation Function 
plots (PACF) are then examined at periodic lags of 12 months which can reveal any 
need for seasonal differencing. ACF and PACF plots are then inspected in the usual 
manner to reveal whether the seasonal model is autoregressive or moving average and 
how many parameters it should have. Parsimonious models are preferred. The 
residuals of this model are then investigated to determine, again using ACF and PACF 
plots, the form of the non-seasonal model. It is the overall residuals from this 
application that must be judged as white noise after examining the Box-Ljung Q 
statistics. 
 
The intervention variable can take a variety of forms but intuitively it is easy to justify 
an abrupt step function because of the apparent impact of Southwest start ups on 
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traffic volumes on routes7. In addition, if this start up coincides with other important 
exogenous influences, they would also have to be specifically examined and isolated. 
Although this conventional reason cannot be invoked for the routes studied here, it is 
interesting to examine the abrupt intervention impact on domestic propensity to fly of 
9/11 and this is done. 
 
4.0 Results 
4.1  Washington-Chicago 
Table 3 shows annual flows on the Washington-Chicago corridor. In the early 1990’s 
United and American dominate the market with shares approaching or exceeding 90 
percent. Southwest commences service in 1993 and in its first full year of operation, 
the total market grows by 18 percent.  Southwest has nearly 11 percent of this market 
and the main incumbents share has fallen to below 80 percent. Southwest appears to 
increase and consolidate its share of a growing market until the late 1990’s when it 
falls slightly. There is clearly an impact on traffic from 9/11 and the total market 
exceeds year 2000 levels again by 2004 with Southwest’s share again reduced. These 
relative fluctuations appear to be a product of competition between the main carriers 
as well as American Eagle and ATA and the impact of the short-lived Independence 
Air. The commencement of Southwest service at IAD in  late 2006 is also noteworthy. 
A monthly plot of the time series is shown in Figure 1 with the date of the BWI airline 
intervention indicated8. 
 
ARIMA modelling identification was based on the total traffic before September 1993 
when Southwest started. The ACF and PACF plots of the stationary data, after taking 
                                                 
7 This is also the argument advanced and tested in Pitfield (2007a). 
8 The 9/11 date is common to each graph and not specifically marked. 
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logarithms and regular and seasonal differencing, gives a (1, 1, 0) (2, 1, 0)12 model 
and this has white noise residuals. Applying this model form to the traffic from 1990 
to 2006, including intervention variables to represent Southwest’s start and 9/11, 
gives the results shown in Table 4. A less parsimonious model with an additional 
seasonal autoregressive parameter also did well but there is some doubt about the 
order of such a model (see McDowall et al, 1980).  
 
The intervention variables show that Southwest expanded the traffic on the route by 
19 percent, somewhat higher than its current annual market share but quite consistent 
with its initial impact9. The implication is that Southwest brought additional 
passengers to the route attracted by its low fares but that it had little impact on the 
traffic carried by competing carriers. Indeed, it may have lost some of its initial traffic 
to other airlines as they responded to the competition. 
 
The 9/11 impact suggests a decline of over 50 percent. This impact is large but may 
be consistent with the findings of Blunk, Clark and McGibany (2006) on revenue 
passenger miles who argue that the impact of 9/11 is longer term and more permanent 
than industry analysts had first supposed. These revenue passenger mile figures would 
now be higher if you pose the counter-factual that 9/11 did not happen. The estimated 
impact also appears to be consistent with estimated impacts on some north Atlantic 
traffic (see Pitfield, 2007b). 
 
The code share agreement in February 2005 with ATA produced no significant 
coefficients. Although the start of the IAD service is very recent it was also examined 
                                                 
9 This estimate is far less than the impacts found in previous studies using quarterly data that looked at 
airports where Southwest operates but examining the total corridor is likely to show more modest 
impacts. 
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as was Independence Air. Neither had significant impacts with t values between 1 and 
2 but their coefficients were positive and respectively 10 and 6 percent; the Southwest 
impact at BWI was not materially affected by the inclusion of these variables 
indicating robustness in the results. 
 
4.2  Philadelphia-Chicago 
Table 5 shows the annual traffic between PHL and both ORD and MDW. There is a 
step increase in the traffic when ATA offers service from MDW after 1998 and 
another large increase after 2003. This is probably in part a reaction to the disturbance 
to trends from 9/11 and the entry in May 2004 of Southwest. Both of these effects can 
be tested. In its first full year of operation, Southwest has 18.12 percent of the market 
and it grew to over 20 percent in 200610. 
 
There is little to choose here between a (1,1,0) (2,1,0)12 ARIMA model and a  
(1,1,0) (3,1,0)12 alternative except for the parsimony of the former. On that basis 
although 9/11 is seen to have a large significant impact (-0.60), the start up of 
Southwest is not significant with a parameter estimated at 0.40 and t=0.63. 
Alternative specifications of the model appear to indicate quite robust estimates of the 
parameters. Neither intervention estimates or their significance changes very much. 
The results are shown in Table 611. 
 
The results are surprising, but perhaps predictable. If the four months at the end of 
2000 are compared to the four at the end of 2001, a near 20 percent traffic decline is 
observed. On that basis the 60 percent value for 9/11 may be an overestimate although 
                                                 
10 Monthly data is plotted in Figure 2 and the start of service date indicated. 
11 A gradual intervention effect over 12 months did not improve the results. 
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as noted above, there is some work that suggests it should be less but not considerably 
so. The Southwest effect may be surprising, however, this is not a leisure route 
primarily and one of the airports used is secondary; both factors weighing against a 
larger impact. The raw data shows an immediate but short-lived upturn after May 
2004 and it may be for this reason that the impact is not significant12. 
 
Monthly traffic for the main airlines on the route is shown in Table 7 from May 2004 
to try and aid understanding. The total grows for the first three months, but in August, 
the traffic of United, US Airways and Southwest all fell. In September they were 
joined by American and ATA, with most making some recovery in October. 
 
There is no large change in airline supply that explains these fluctuations either 
absolutely or relatively. Demand on this route generally fell in some months after 
May, so Southwest’s impact on size, despite its growing share, does not register as 
significant. Despite the lack of significance of a market size effect, it is clear that 
Southwest itself thrived with a nearly 22 percent share of the market in 200613. In 
other words, it did not expand the market size but it did take traffic from competitors. 
 
4.3  Boston-Chicago 
Looking at the annual traffic data in Table 8 shows the initially dominant position of 
United and American between these city pairs. Even after Southwest starts service 
between MDW and PVD in October 1996, it only captures 6.02 percent of the market 
in the first year of operation, although this of course represents a higher percentage of 
                                                 
12 Again the ATA code share is not significant. 
13 There is a suggestion that Southwest might be competing with itself at Boston and Baltimore, but 
these alternatives offered service earlier, so it should be their traffic that is diluted on the start of the 
PHL service. In addition, at around 100 miles away it could be argued that they are too far distant. 
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the Chicago-Providence market alone. The next year service to MHT starts in June 
and at the year end Southwest’s overall share is up to nearly 8 percent. It appears to 
do well in competition with American at PVD in the next year as American’s share 
falls and Southwest’s rises, however, in 2000 the major influence on shares is the 
significant arrival of ATA Airlines, another low-cost carrier, on the BOS-MDW route. 
9/11 depresses overall traffic seemingly not influencing shares, however, the next 
major influence appears to be the influence of the code sharing agreement between 
ATA and Southwest in February 2005. After ATA filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection, Southwest invested in ATA and upon their resulting exit from chapter 11, 
replaced ATA with code sharing flights on the Boston-Chicago Corridor using PVD 
and MHT as before. 
 
This seems a very interesting route to study using ARIMA methods as both Southwest 
start ups can be examined for a significant intervention effect, along with 9/11 and the 
code sharing agreement. Figure 3 shows the time series plot. Not only are the start of 
service dates to PVD and MHT shown respectively, but so is the start of the ATA 
code sharing agreement. 
 
Following the usual procedures, an autoregressive model of the usual form is fitted 
and this gives the results shown in Table 9. Neither the start up at PVD nor the later 
one at MHT are statistically significant as abrupt impacts but they do have the right 
signs and show an impact of 5.7 and 4.8 percent respectively14. The 9/11 impact is 
significant with a coefficient of -0.43. The ATA code share is omitted from the Table 
as it is insignificant. 
                                                 
14 Varying model forms produces quite robust similar estimates and a gradual intervention again fails to 
produce significant results but suggests bigger impacts of 14 and 19 percent for PVD and MHT 
respectively. 
 13
 
These results, like those for Philadelphia – Chicago, imply that although the impact of 
Southwest on market size is insignificant, the fact that they have over 17 percent of 
the market in 2006 shows that they had an impact on the shares of their competitors, 
in this case, American, judging from Table 8. 
 
4.4 Bay Area-Chicago 
Table 10 shows the annual shares on the corridor with the early dominance of United 
and American. This position is maintained in the 21st century, but the relative position 
of these two airlines is weakened as can be seen from their falling shares. The figures 
for Southwest show a gradual impact on market share, followed by a boost in 2005 
which may be the result of the ATA code share. This intervention can be tested along 
with the Southwest start up and 9/11. Figure 4 shows the monthly traffic data where 
some of the impacts discussed seem to be plain and others more obscure. 
 
The usual procedures again yield a (1,1,0) (2,1,0) 12 model and the results are shown 
in Table 11 although there is a question mark over the character of the residuals with a 
spike at lag 36. Less parsimonious models can push this spike to greater lags but are 
questionable as model improvements. All show, however, the 9/11 intervention to be 
significant and sizable with the Southwest start up and the advent of code share 
insignificant. Specifying the Southwest intervention as a gradual one does not 
improve the result. As with the previous case, the implication, given their market 
share in 2006 of over 18 percent, is that this traffic largely came from their 
competitors. 
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4.5 Denver–Las Vegas 
Traffic is dominated by United Airlines throughout this period from 1990. Southwest 
starts service in January 2006 and it can be seen from Table 12 that it took nearly 20 
percent of the market in its first year. Figure 5 shows an abrupt upturn of traffic when 
it started. The intervention analysis can suggest what percentage Southwest’s entry 
added to the market and this can be compared to its actual share. 
 
Examining the monthly traffic data, it is clear that this route was impacted in a major 
way by the events of September 11th 2001. Traffic falls by some 33 percent between 
September and the end of the year but it recovers its pre 9/11 absolute levels of traffic 
by March 2002. Consequently in the ARIMA modelling it is essential to again include 
this impact and so a model was first developed that fitted the data from January 1990 
to August 2001. After examining ACF and PACF plots, this is found to be a (1, 1, 0) 
(2, 1, 0)12 model. Applying this form to the series from January 1990 to December 
2006, including binary intervention variables indicating immediate impact for 9/11 
and the start of Southwest service, gives the model detailed in Table 13. The residuals 
of this model have insignificant Box-Ljung Q statistics, except marginally so at 
distant lags that even then do not have a concerning periodicity of 12. The residuals 
are white noise. 
 
Of principal interest, the Southwest start up increased traffic on the route by 18 
percent which is close to the market share of 19.42 percent actually achieved in 2006. 
Even in the first year of operation, Southwest may have taken some traffic from 
competitors. This impact reflects the relatively short period of service from Southwest 
and the presence of a competing low cost airline, Frontier. Both these factors pull the 
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likely impact down. Contrary to this are the facts that the traffic is not between 
secondary airports and may well represent a majority of leisure traffic. These factors 
would both push the impact up. 
 
The 9/11 parameter shows that traffic was negatively impacted by 41.8 percent. This 
degree of impact is consistent with the simple observation of the series and may well 
be in accordance with previous findings.  
 
5.0 Conclusions 
Similar ARIMA models are developed for each of the chosen corridors. The results 
show the significant impact of 9/11 in all cases and the significant impact on size of 
Southwest’s start up in two of the five cases at around 20 percent. How do these 
impacts compare to those found in other empirical work? Are these results in 
accordance with past work?  
 
Table 14 illustrates the paradigm of interpretations of effects giving the datum of 
market share and the estimated impact on size. It shows that Southwest is in the last 
two rows of the Table either taking traffic entirely from competitors, as its entry does 
not grow the market, or growing the market and keeping that traffic. Ryanair is in the 
first category where it grows the market and takes share from competitors. It has 
significant and often larger impacts from market entry. 
 
The impact of Southwest is less than that found for the majority of routes examined in 
Pitfield (2007a) for Ryanair. Exceptions are Stockholm and Hamburg’s start up 
impacts. These are lower and of the order of 10 percent and these might be argued to 
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be comparable to the Southwest routes in terms of scale and market segment but the 
impacts on Venice, Pisa and Genoa were estimated at 26, 30 and 44 percent 
respectively. What reasons can be used to explain this difference?  
 
First of all, the Italian destinations analysed are more likely to be dominated by 
leisure traffic than the US cases, with the exception of Las Vegas. However the Las 
Vegas service has only been in place for just over a year so it may be too early to 
assess the true long term impact of Southwest.  
 
Second, the number of carriers on the routes is higher in the US cases than the 
European and the scale of traffic is considerably higher on all corridors except 
London – Stockholm.  
 
Third, Ryanair, with its frequent offerings of flights at £0.01, as they still appear on 
the website excluding taxes and charges, may be a more aggressive competitor. 
However an examination of fares being offered on two routes with similar stage 
length, four months from the time of writing (August 3rd 2007) shows that the Ryanair 
return fare with all taxes and charges was £118 or $217 whereas the Southwest 
promotional fare was $246 or £134. In this case Ryanair is only fractionally cheaper 
so its ‘normal’ fares don’t indicate any competitive edge but its reputation and its non-
inclusive fares may. 
 
For all these reasons, it might be concluded that Southwest, when it has significant 
effects, has a smaller initial impact than Ryanair but that Ryanair establishes larger 
market shares as a result of its impact on competitors. It appears that the major US 
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competitors are more competitive than most of Ryanair’s competitors in maintaining 
share through pricing and product differentiation. 
 
Finally, the explanation for the different estimates might be based on the different 
levels of network maturity and familiarity with low-cost service and this topic could 
be approached empirically using Gini coefficients (Huber, 2005). This might be why 
the Ryanair impacts are higher than the Southwest impacts established using the same 
time series methodology.  
 
As for the comparison with the previous estimates for Southwest, focussing on the 
change in traffic at the airports where Southwest operates, the approach previously 
used, is likely to give more dramatic impacts than when the whole corridor is 
examined in what Vowles (2001) might call routes between multi-airport regions and 
the estimated impacts are in keeping with the simple examination of the data. 
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Table 1: Top Ten US Airports by Total Passengers, 2005 
 
Airport Total passengers 
Atlanta, Hartsfield(ATL) 85,907,423 
Chicago, O’Hare(ORD) 75,510,003 
Los Angeles(LAX) 61,485,269 
Dallas/Ft.Worth(DFW) 59,064,360 
Las Vegas(LAS) 44,280,190 
Denver(DEN) 43,307,335 
Phoenix, Sky Harbor(PHX) 41,204,071 
New York(JFK) 40,584,001 
Houston(IAH) 39,713,920 
Minneapolis/St.Paul(MSP) 37,563,664 
Source: Derived from http:/infoplease.com/ipa/A0004547.html 
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Table 2: Passenger Flows between Airport Pairs, 2005 
 
Airport Pairs 2 way passenger traffic 
2005 
Approx summer period flights 
per day 
 
Los Angeles(LAX)-Las 
Vegas (LAS) 
 
 
2,423,208 
 
68 
 
New York La Guardia 
(LGA)-Chicago O’Hare 
(ORD) 
2,289,646 71 
 
ORD-LAX 
 
2,285,468 
 
45 
 
LGA- Atlanta Hartsfield 
(ATL) 
2,248,702 59 
 
New York John F 
Kennedy (JFK)-LAX 
 
 
2,216,267 
 
58 
 
ATL-Dallas Fort Worth 
(DFW) 
2,212,884 64 
 
LAS-Phoenix Sky Harbor 
(PHX) 
 
 
2,049,611 
 
63 
 
Minneapolis St. Paul 
(MSP)-ORD 
1,693,561 64 
 
ATL-Newark (EWR) 
 
1,680,416 
 
53 
 
LAX-San Francisco (SFO) 
 
1,559,803 
 
64 
 
Philadelphia (PHL)-ORD 
 
1,568,039 
 
44 
 
Denver (DEN)-LAS 
 
1,473,479 
 
51 
 
Boston Logan (BOS)-LGA 
 
1,465,546 
 
83 
 
ORD-Washington Reagan 
(DCA) 
 
1,447,809 
 
52 
 
DCA-LGA 
 
1,369,460 
 
80 
 
Houston (HOU)-Dallas 
(DAL) 
 
1,231,220 
 
65 
   
Based on BTS Form 41 traffic data at 
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table_ID=258 
and FAA data on flights at http://www.apo.data.faa.gov/main/ 
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Table 3: Washington – Chicago Corridor 1990 – 2006 
 
Year Total Pax Southwest % United 
Airlines % 
American 
Airlines % 
1990 2,375,112  60.44 24.44 
1991 2,393,607  66.03 21.67 
1992 2,511,298  68.81 27.34 
1993 2,755,761   2.73* 67.77 24.43 
1994 3,263,068 10.77 58.71 20.79 
1995 3,211,786 14.76 54.03 20.90 
1996 3,194,699 15.72 57.48 18.93 
1997 3,124,296 15.98 58.13 19.13 
1998 3,342,934 13.88 60.68 17.88 
1999 3,401,489 13.58 59.80 13.40 
2000 3,568,048 13.55 52.66 19.59 
2001 3,195,510 14.85 53.96 21.24 
2002 3,250,954 13.99 56.19 21.97 
2003 3,408,891 13.63 56.77 19.96 
2004 3,712,138 10.67 55.62 19.59 
2005 3,927,290 10.55 52.29 19.82 
2006 3,773,597 13.50 56.72 13.65 
*part year 
  Derived from BTS Data 
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Table 4: Washington-Chicago Results 
 
 Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR1 -0.17 -2.54 SE=0.06 
SAR1 -0.62 -8.60 Log Likelihood=253.21 
SAR2 -0.22 -3.00 AIC=-496.43 
9/11 Intervention -0.56 -10.29 SBC=-480.17 
SWest Intervention 0.19 3.54  
RMS=15517.17 U=0.03 UM=0.01 US= 0.00          UC=0.99 
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Table 5: Philadelphia – Chicago Corridor 1990 – 2006 
 
Year Total Pax Southwest % 
1990 1,245,537  
1991 1,131,277  
1992 1,024,024  
1993 1,076,295    
1994 1,221,128  
1995 1,101,345  
1996 1,134,167  
1997 1,202,547  
1998 1,214,754  
1999 1,309,552  
2000 1,436,632  
2001 1,368,553  
2002 1,530,130  
2003 1,497,428  
2004 1,876,068 7.15* 
2005 1,920,027 18.12 
2006 1,873,505 21.67 
*part year 
  Derived from BTS Data 
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Table 6: Philadelphia-Chicago Results 
 
 Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR1 -0.20 -3.26 SE=0.09 
SAR1 -0.57 -7.89 Log Likelihood=225.17 
SAR2 -0.23 -9.57 AIC=-440.34 
9/11 Intervention -0.60 -9.57 SBC=-424.08 
SWest Intervention 0.04 0.63  
RMS=8299.27 U=0.04 UM=0.00 US= 0.03          UC=0.98 
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Table 7: Philadelphia – Chicago Traffic by Airline and Month from May 2004 
 
 
 
  
                   American       ATA         Southwest    United      US Airways   Total 
May 37,414 26,910 12,999 59,341 31,734 168,398 
June 44,960 26,649 18,338 60,712 40,764 191,423 
July 43,971 28,766 19,325 61,640 40,408 194,110 
August 45,271 30,978 18,397 57,855 37,656 190,157 
September 39,119 21,519 15,225 48,744 34,083 158,690 
October 45,020 23,468 16,750 49,939 39,369 174,546 
November 41,458 19,194 16,885 48,474 36,548 162,559 
December 38,973 17,462 16,287 46,321 32,214 151,257  
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Table 8: Boston – Chicago Corridor 1990 – 2006 
 
Year Total Pax Southwest % United 
Airlines % 
American 
Airlines % 
1990 1,851,286  53.57 35.14 
1991 1,864,459  55.05 34.10 
1992 1,757,672  57.15 40.24 
1993 1,810,847  56.15 39.59 
1994 1,918,401  55.86 39.47 
1995 1,968,585  53.13 42.71 
1996 2,073,424 1.14* 52.32 44.66 
1997 2,311,873 6.02 51.06 41.39 
1998 2,572,384 7.85** 51.68 39.59 
1999 2,657,353 11.76 52.77 35.03 
2000 2,733,033 11.11 47.93 35.62 
2001 2,605,881 10.14 47.47 33.43 
2002 2,746,546 9.18 50.02 32.51 
2003 2,903,620 10.12 48.91 31.60 
2004 2,959,571 9.42 45.35 34.93 
2005 2,961,009 12.97 44.22 33.30 
2006 2,853,015 17.22 46.09 26.98 
* part year of PVD start 
** part year MHT start 
  Derived from BTS Data 
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Table 9: Boston-Chicago Results 
 
 Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR1 -0.21 -3.21 SE=0.06 
SAR1 -0.46 -6.13 Log Likelihood=269.14 
SAR2 -0.21 -2.83 AIC=-526.29 
9/11 Intervention -0.43 -8.63 SBC=-506.77 
SWest Intervention 
PVD 
0.06 1.15  
SWest Intervention 
MHT 
0.05 0.98  
RMS=11693.17 U=0.03 UM=0.00 US=0.02              UC=0.99 
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Table 10: Bay Area – Chicago Corridor 1990 – 2006 
 
Year Total Pax Southwest % UA % AA % 
1990 1,933,590  72.74 25.75 
1991 1,904,656  73.72 24.47 
1992 2,111,897  72.72 26.62 
1993 2,043,722  74.33 24.84 
1994 2,135,456  74.67 23.69 
1995 2,211,022  69.75 25.52 
1996 2,354,136  70.46 24.07 
1997 2,393,423  69.65 23.88 
1998 2,458,742  69.03 23.01 
1999 2,397,362  67.97 22.02 
2000 2,404,513  64.85 22.48 
2001 2,251,178  64.88 21.15 
2002 2,547,989 6.21* 62.34 18.58 
2003 2,736,346 8.20 60.33 17.69 
2004 2,778,735 8.44 58.47 17.32 
2005 2,511,592 16.22 55.15 20.89 
2006 2,370,150 18.43 58.56 21.04 
  * part year 
Derived from BTS Data 
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Table 11: Bay Area-Chicago Results 
 
 Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR1 -0.21 -3.20 SE=0.06 
SAR1 -0.42 -5.71 Log Likelihood=260.65 
SAR2 -0.20 -2.60 AIC=-511.30 
9/11 Intervention -0.45 -8.85 SBC=-495.03 
SWest Intervention 0.04 0.68  
RMS=11868.89 U=0.03 UM=0.00 US= 0.03          UC=0.97 
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Table 12: Denver– Las Vegas 1990 – 2006 
 
Year Total Pax Southwest % 
1990    695,184  
1991    714,951  
1992    822,614  
1993    826,153    
1994    913,569  
1995    847,131  
1996    978,405  
1997    966,317  
1998    892,906  
1999 1,079,639  
2000 1,104,609  
2001 1,051,445  
2002 1,043,382  
2003 1,212,509  
2004 1,347,436  
2005 1,473,479  
2006 1,955,090 19.42 
  Derived from BTS Data 
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Table 13: Denver- Las Vegas Results 
 
 Parameters t tests Goodness of Fit 
AR1 -0.24 -3.39 SE=0.08 
SAR1 -0.60 -8.44 Log Likelihood=203.87 
SAR2 -0.31 -4.26 AIC=-397.74 
9/11 Intervention -0.42 -5.97 SBC=-381.48 
SWest Intervention 0.18 2.17  
RMS=7724.80 U=0.04 UM=0.00 US= 0.01          UC=0.99 
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Table 14: Paradigm of Interpretation of Impacts on Market Share and Size 
 
 
Market Share x % 
(Datum) 
Impact on Size y % 
(Estimate) 
Interpretation 
x                                   > y Grew market and took traffic 
from competitors e.g. Ryanair 
 
x                                   < y Grew market but failed to hold 
share e.g. GO 
 
x                                   = y Grew market and retained 
market share. Little impact on 
competitors shares e.g. new 
markets? – Southwest, 
Washington-Chicago 
 
  x y Insignificant Did not grow market so took 
share from competitors e.g. 
Southwest – Philadelphia-
Chicago 
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Figure 1: Washington-Chicago Monthly Traffic 1990-2006 
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Figure 2: Philadelphia-Chicago Monthly Traffic 1990-2006 
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Figure 3: Boston-Chicago Monthly Traffic 1990-2006 
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Figure 4: Bay Area-Chicago Monthly Traffic 1990-2006 
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Figure 5: Denver–Las Vegas Monthly Traffic 1990-2006 
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